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RECENT DECISIONS

Interstate injunctions do not, in theory, clash with the right that
a husband has to seek in good faith a new domicile, and there obtain
the relief afforded by its courts, since such injunctions are premised
upon a finding that the husband is, in fact, a domiciliary of the
forum. It follows therefore, on principle, that it is immaterial whether
the injunction is in form temporary or permanent-in either event
it will lose all22 efficacy if the husband thereafter obtains a new bona
fide domicile.
Although an ex parte foreign divorce decree based on a sham
domicile is as invalid today as it was before the Williams case 23 the
court, in the instant case, held that the prima facie validity which
must now be accorded such decrees constituted a sufficient basis for
the issuance of an injunction. No doubt the court was not unaware
of the fact that even the so-called void decree before the Williams
case was not wholly without an injurious effect upon the nonmigratory spouse. 24 Whether or not the issuance of interstate injunctions may lead to socially desirable results,2 5 it seems clear that
the injunctive process will now receive greater use as a means of deterring those spouses whose only intent is to obtain foreign divorce
decrees based on a sham domicile.

X
INJUNCTION-UNFAIR COMPETITION-INTERVENTION TO PROTECT MODERN BUSINESS INTERESTS.-The Metropolitan Opera Association sought to enjoin defendant's unauthorized manufacture and
sale of "off the air" recordings of the Metropolitan's opera performances. An intervening plaintiff recording company had, by
refused to allow the husband to set up in a supplemental answer a Nevada
decree
procured in disregard of the injunction.
22
See Note 13 BRooicYN L. REv. 148, 161, n. 66 (1946) ; 28 ILL. L. REv.
295, 296 (19335.

23 Before the Williants case a spouse seeking to impeach a foreign decree
had to show that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the matrimonial
domicile; today it must be proved that the migratory spouse was not domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. The distinction is in the quantity and quality
of proof required to upset the foreign decree.
24 A direct financial injury might possibly result to the wife even under
the void decree. The husband might marry again. If the second "wife" sued
for separate maintenance the husband would be estopped from setting up the
void decree under the rule of Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d
290 (1940). The husband would then be under a duty to support two wives
thus affecting the amount of supprt the first wife would obtain. For a discussion of other injuries, not financial, which a wife may sustain as a result
of a void decree, see Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926); Comment, 9 FoRD. L. REv. 376 (1940).
25 "In all the cases where an injunction has issued against foreign divorce,
there has been an actual family break-up. . . . If anything, it [the injunction]
is likely still further to widen the breach." Jacobs, mipra note 19, at 390.
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contract with the Opera Association, the exclusive right to make
and sell all such recordings. Held, preliminary injunction granted.
There is an inherent property right in such a production involving
the expenditure of time, effort, money and skill. This property
right was not abandoned by broadcasting, and the misappropriation
by the defendant was such unfair competition that equity will enjoin it. Moreover, the defendant's acts constituted a wrongful interference with the contractual rights of the plaintiffs. Metropolitan
Opera Association, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N. Y. S. 2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
Initiated by the dicta in Gee v. Pritchard1 there has developed
the rule that equity will protect only property rights. Despite the
contention by many authorities that this limitation should be abolished, 2 few jurisdictions have permitted the intervention of equity
to protect rights of a purely personal or political nature.3 The courts,
however, have mitigated the harshness of the rule by exercising
leniency in the determination of the existence of a property right.
This relaxation is particularly apparent in cases in which equitable
relief has been sought for the protection of business interests. 4 "The
rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of
property rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a
property right." ' It should be noted, however, that relief will not
be given merely because it is possible to find a property right on
which to attach jurisdiction. In certain cases the courts have declined to find that the plaintiff had an exclusive right in the thing
the defendant was appropriating." The basis for many such decisions is the belief that the injury which would result if the defendant's acts were to be enjoined would be greater than the harm
occasioned to the plaintiff by their continuance. There is an awareness that if too much leniency is exercised in the finding of a property
right the result may be a burden on the type of competition which
society desires. Thus, before the courts will find a property right
they must be satisfied that the defendant's acts constitute unfair

'Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 403, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).

2See Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890);
Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARV. L. Rav. 388, 407
(1921) ; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Person-

ality, 29 HARv. L. Rav. 640 (1916).

3 Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919); Kenyon v. City
of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N. E. 2d 241 (1946).
4 "The courts have been increasingly inclined to protect business interests
even when such interests do not come within strict definitions of property."
Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 192, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692, 698
(4th Dep't 1928).
5 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236 (1918).
6 Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.

denied, 281 U. S. 728 (1930); Viavi Co. v. Vimedia Co., 245 Fed. 289 (8th
Cir. 1917); Continental Car-Na-Var Corporation v. Mosely, 24 Cal. 2d 104,

148 P. 2d 9 (1944).

1951]

RECENT DECISIONS

competition and are not merely an exercise of the right to free enterprise.
In the past it was not too difficult to prophesy when equity
would intervene. There were certain well-established cases where
aid would be given, for example, those involving trade secrets 7 or
trade-names,8 and other equally well-established cases in which it
would be denied, as was done in the design cases. 9 Along with the
advent of the intricacies of modern trade has come, however, an
enlargement of the recognition of business assets and interests as
property rights. The unprecedented case of International News
Service v. Associated Press'0 demonstrated the ability and willingness of equity to protect these interests against unfair competition
when the remedy at law is inadequate.
In the field of radio, equity has upheld the exclusive right to
broadcast the World Series," and a boxing exhibition. 12 In the
field of motion pictures it has restrained the unauthorized use of
films of a hockey game.' 3 The property right of a cartoonist to
the exclusive use of the characters which he has made famous has
been protected against misappropriation.14 Recognizing the importance of seniority rights, pensions, and other benefits gained by labor,
the courts have held that these benefits when existing under a subsisting contract constitute property rights and are entitled to protection.' , Even in situations where relief traditionally has obtained,
I Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. 154 (1887) ; Macbeth-

Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76 86 At1 688 (1913).
8 Potter-Wrightington, Inc. v. Ward baking Co., 288 Fed. 597 (D. C.
Mass. 1923), aff'd. 298 Fed. 398 (1st Cir. 1924); Danton v. Mohler Barber
School 88 Ore. 164, 170 Pac. 288 (1918).
1 dheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U. S. 728 (1930).
10248 U. S. 215 (1918) (the Supreme Court recognized a quasi property
right in "hot news" and held that a misappropriation of that right by the
defendant warranted the granting of injunctive relief).
l Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc., and Gillette Safety Razor Co. v.
Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
12 Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press, Inc., 165
Misc. 71, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
13 Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div.
459, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938).
14 Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133 (1921); see Note,
19 A. L. R. 937 (1921).
10 In many cases the courts while holding that these rights constitute property rights are unable to protect them. The reason is that ordinarily the contract under which these rights exist has been breached by the employer and
the employee seeks to regain these property rights by an action for specific
performance of the contract of employment. The court cannot grant specific
performance of the contract since it is for personal services and therefore cannot protect the rights arising thereunder. Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading
Seashore Lines, 142 N. J. Eq. 588, 61 A. 2d 453 (Ch. 1948); McMenamin v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 88, 51 A. 2d 702 (1947). However, in
some cases the contract under which these rights exist is subsisting, but some
third party, usually a labor union, by improper acts has deprived the employee
of these property rights. In such cases the courts can and do grant relief.
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new rules have been developed to meet modern needs. In the instance of trade-names the old view was that injunctive relief was
warranted where, in competition with the plaintiff, there was a "palming off" of the defendant's product as that of the plaintiff.1 6 Today,
realizing the value of the good will that a trade-name can attain
through extensive advertising, equity has established a more liberal
rule. It has granted relief although no competition existed between
the plaintiff's and defendant's businesses, when there was a misappropriation of a trade-name
which had assumed a secondary mean7
ing, a good will of its own.'
In the principal case there was no allegation of "palming off".
Plaintiff, Metropolitan Opera Association, is a non-profit organization, and there was no competition between its business and that
of the defendant. Nevertheless, the court recognized the value of
the creative element in a skillful opera production, and held that
it constituted property and was entitled to equitable protection. The
facts in the case are unique and the court's action in enjoining "off
the air" recordings is unprecedented. Its correctness cannot be denied. It is illustrative not only of the wide range of interests which
equity acts ,to protect, but also of the extremes to which it will go
to find a property right on which to attach jurisdiction when unfair
competition is established. Moreover, labeling it "unfair competition"
demonstrates the refusal of equity courts to establish any specific
prerequisites for injunctive relief. This is to be lauded, for unfair
competition cn take such a myriad of forms that to limit equity's
power to intervene would result in the opening of a door to ingenious
wrongdoers who can avoid the necessary prerequisites and nevertheless be guilty of unfair competition. Whether or not there is
unfair competition must depend upon the facts of the individual
case, but once unfair competition is established, the rules governing
equitable relief are sufficiently flexible so as to assure protection.

Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers International Ass'n, 324
Pa. 257, 188 Ati. 206 (1936) ; see Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. 2d 971, 979 (1934).
16 See note 8 supra; cf. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 201 Fed. 510, (7th Cir. 1912) (injunction denied because there was no
competition between plaintiff's arid defendant's products).
'7 Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F. 2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947);
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932),
af'd, 262 N. Y. 482. 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
"Because an attractive, reputable
trade-name can be imitated not for the purpose of diverting trade from its
owner, but rather for the purpose of securing some of the good will, advertising, and sales stimulation appurtenant to it, the interest in a trade-name
came to be protected against being subjected to the hazards of another's business not in actual competition."
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F.
Supp. 90, 93 (E. D. Pa. 1941).

